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L. RAY PATTERSON*
The application of copyright law to new communications technology has brought
to fruition the latent conflict between political rights and property rights-that is,
the political right of access guaranteed by the First Amendment and the property
right of copyright. The original conflict-created by a combination of the printing
press and religious controversy in England-was resolved partly by the
transformation of a perpetual copyright for publishers to a limited statutory
copyrightfor authors. The authorproposes that the computer, the modern analogue
to the sbieenth-centuy printing press, revives this conflict. The original publication
copyright has been supplemented by a transmission copyright that gives the
copyright holder complete control of access to a copyrighted work even after the
work has entered the stream of commerce; and statutory copyright, which was
created as a regulatory monopoly, has become a proprietary monopoly.
The author contends that the basic solution to the emerging conflict is to return
copyright to its function as a regulatory monopoly. In order for this change to
occur, it will be necessary to return copyright to its original proprietary base. The
proprietary base-copyright as an easement-serves the interest of three groups:
authors, publishers, and users. The author presents the Supreme Court case of
International News Service v. Associated Press as a model for this change.
I.
Proprietary rights in information and learning can reduce free speech rights to the
status of an empty slogan. Chapter 12 of the Copyright Act, entitled Copyright
Management and Protection Systems, enacted in 1998 as part of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),' exemplifies the core issue of copyright in the
new millennium-the conflict between property rights and political rights-and
proves the point The heart of the DMCA is its provisions to prevent the infringement
of electronic databases and other digital works by making anti-circumvention devices
and their use illegal in order to protect the copyright holder's "property." Thus, the
statute provides that "[n]o person shall circumvent a technological protection measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.'' The DMCA also
prohibits the manufacture, sale, or importation of products or services primarily
designed to enable circumvention of technological protection measures or that have
* Pope Brock Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
117 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (Supp. IV 1998).
2 § 1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
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limited commercial significance other than for circumvention,3 and imposes severe
criminal sanctions on one who engages in circumvention and the manufacture or sale
of the means of circumvention "willfully and for the purposes of commercial
advantage or private fihancial gain."4 Civil remedies and sanctions include
injunctions, impoundment of the decrypted material, the destruction of copied
material and copying devices, and treble damages for repeat offenders.5
While the statute may be desirable as a matter of trade and commerce, it raises
serious constitutional issues. Not since the Licensing Act of 16626 in England has
copyright been used for censorship to the extent that the DMCA can be used. Just as
copyright was a device of public censorship in seventeenth-century England, the
DMCA is a device of private censorship in the twentieth-century U.S.
Reduced to its essentials, private censorship involves a conflict between property
rights and political rights, and the conflict that the DMCA creates between the two
rights is apparent when one analyzes the two cofncepts. A property right is the right
to control and exclude others from access to, and the use of, the property. A political
right is a right of all members of the body politic. In a free society, one of those rights
is the right of free speech. If the free speech right includes the right to hear as well as
the right to speak, to read as well as to print, as reason demands, it seems clear that
the copyright protection of the DMCA-especially the anti-circumvention
provisions-conflicts with free speech rights. The fact that the right of access may be
only an inchoate component of free speech, however, should not be of much comfort
to copyright holders who oppose it because it would interfere with their "property."
The issue merits a brief discussion.
Free speech is a constitutional right that the U.S. Supreme Court develops only
as needed, and publication as a condition for copyright is an issue that was
traditionally avoided in copyright cases. The Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"),7
however, discarded the publication condition.8 This was a fundamental change in
copyright that will give rise to the need-especially in the use of new
communications technology-for the development of the free speech right of access
as a plenary right. There are, indeed, several factors suggesting that the Court will
soon need to remove the right of access from the free speech back-burer and make
it a respected component of free speech rights. First of all, copyright entrepreneurs
tend to ignore both constitutional and statutory restraints. For example, the
constitutional mandate that copyright protect the public domain and the statutory right
3 § 1201(b)(1).
4 § 1203(a) (imposing five to ten year imprisonment and $500,000-$1,000,000 fines).
5 § 1203.
6 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 33 (Eng.).
7 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
8 Notes of Committee on Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 102 at Historical and Statutory Notes 47 (1996).
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of fair use are often ignored. Secondly, the Court has already recognized the right,
although it remains undeveloped. 9 Third, a reason for protecting the press is to enable
it to inform the public.' 0 If the public has a right of indirect access through an
intermediary, it would be anomalous to deny the public the right of direct access
when the occasion arises. Lastly, even if the First Amendment is obscure on this
point, the Copyright Clause 1 contains free speech values--the promotion of learning
(because it so states), the protection of the public domain (because copyright is for
original material for limited times), and the right of public access (because "the
exclusive Right" is the right of exclusive publication) 12-that provide the basis for
a remedy.
When we consider these various factors, it seems clear that the DMCA-
especially the anti-circumvention provisions-creates a conflict between property
rights and the political right of free speech, and makes manifest an obvious, but little
recognized characteristic of copyright: it is a device for controlling the conduct of
others in relation to a copyrighted work by excluding them from using it, even to the
extent of controlling their use of the copy they own in violation of the copyright
statute. 13 As Justice Holmes explained in 1908:
The right to exclude is not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo
so to speak. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the
party having the right It may be inifinged a thousand miles from the owner and without
his ever becoming aware of the wrong.14
9 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (upholding denial of visa to alien
advocating communism); Bd. of Ed. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that
local school boards must be permitted to establish and apply their curriculum to transmit
community values).10 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (placing great responsibility
upon the news media to inform public).
I1 The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power: 'To
promote the Progress of Science... by securing for [a] limited time[ ] to Authors... the
exclusive Right to their... Writings. . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12 See L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and 'The Exclusive Right' ofAuthors, I J. OF INTELL
PROP. LAw 1 (1993).
13 Consider, for example, the current style of the copyright notice, which provides that no one
may copy any portion of the work at any time by any means for any purpose without the
permission ofthe publisher. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). A variation is that one may
copy pages for a fee, e.g. fifty cents per page, the fee to be forwarded to the Copyright Clearance
Center. The notices, of course, rarely mention the right of fair use, although § 107 provides that
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including use by copying, is not an infringement of copyright
Id
14 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, L,
concurring specially).
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If the copyright statute gives the holder the right to prohibit a person's access to
information, clearly copyright is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate that
copyright promote learning, a point that might be irrelevant in an autocratic society,
but not in a free one. 15
The conclusion that the Copyright Clause and the free speech clause may
conflict, however, goes against some two hundred years of copyright law during
which copyright and free speech rights co-existed without serious complaint. One
may reasonably ask why a conflict should have developed during the last quarter of
the twentieth century. There are, as I see it, three reasons. One is that free speech
precedent is a product of the twentieth, not the nineteenth, century, and there is no
basis for claiming that copyright conflicts with non-existent precedent. Another
reason is that new technology creates new ways to disseminate copyrighted works,
and also creates new ways to deny access to the works disseminated. The third reason
is that during the nineteenth, and much of the twentieth century, copyright was a
regulatory monopoly limited to the marketing of works and could be defined as
consisting of limited rights to which a given work was subject for a limited period of
time.
The definition provided in the third reason applies under the 1976 Act, with three
major differences: (1) in the nineteenth century, the copyright term was increased, but
the longest term was relatively short, forty-two years;16 (2) to obtain copyright the
author had to comply with statutory formalities-publication, notice, registration, and
deposit; and (3) the rights granted were specific to the type of work and limited to that
work. Thus copyright was the right to publish a book to copy a work of art, to
perform a drama. Presumably this careful delineation of rights implemented copyright
as a monopoly to be limited to its constitutional purpose, the promotion of learning,
which served the public interest.
Under the 1976 Act as amended, the copyright term has been extended to the
equivalent of four generations or more, and all the rights of copyright apply to all
copyrighted works, except where manifestly inappropriate. 17 Rights that were
formerly defined by terms of art are now defined by the same words as generic terms.
The right to copy a work of art, for example, has become a right to copy all
copyrighted works, even books. The copyright monopoly of the 1976 Act thus served
the copyright holder's private interest in preference to the public interest by
15 The argument that this is justified despite the purpose of copyright stated in the Copyright
Clause is that copyright gives the copyright holder ownership of "the information" that is
copyrighted. But this is contrary to section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which provides that
copyright does not protect ideas, and so forth, because ownership of the work necessarily implies
the ownership of the content of the work, which includes ideas. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998)
16The terms were twenty-eight and fourteen years until the 1909 Act extended the second
term to twenty-eight years.
17 For example, one would have difficulty performing a stone sculpture.
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transforming copyright into a de facto plenary property right This raises a
fundamental issue: how is the public interest served by Congress's transgression of
the constitutional limits on its copyright power to grant "authors" an absolute
monopoly in their writings? The question is relevant because Congress continues to
ignore the limits along the amendment trail. The Copyright Term Extension Act 18
makes the point. How is the public interest served by extending the copyright term
to give extant works an additional twenty years protection?
Copyright, in short, has been changed from a marketing monopoly to a
proprietary monopoly that gives the copyright holder as much control over a
copyrighted work as the title to realty gives the titleholder over a plot of land. The
difference, of course, is that the right to control the conduct of others in relation to
one's land involves considerations different from those involved in the right to control
conduct in relation to books. For example, the right to exclude any and all persons
from land is different from the right to exclude any and all persons from copying
passages from a book. The fee simple title to land gives the titleholder the right to use
the land as he or she wishes. Copyright is the temporary title to information (in
various forms). 19 The very purpose of copyright is to encourage the titleholder to
make the information available for public use in order to learn, which is contrary to
the right of the titleholder to control the use of the work 20 Furthermore, the policy
served by the right to exclude others from one's land is the preservation of the peace
to enable the land owner to enjoy the use of the land, which is unique and cannot be
reproduced; the policy served by the right to exclude others from using a book is
profit for the publisher as assignee of the author. In one instance, the public interest
is served, in the other, a private interest is served. And it is useful to note that the line
between reading a book and copying passages from it is a fictitious distinction to
justify licensing the use of a book after it has been sold, which portends the primrose
path down which copyright entrepreneurs seek to lead legislators and judges.
The reason for the term "intellectual property" is to distinguish the property of
copyright (and patents) from both personality and realty, and we should not make the
mistake of emphasizing the term "property" over the term "intellectual." Equating the
different properties is logical error in the form of the one-word-one-meaning fallacy,
the assumption being that all property is entitled to the same rights. Unfortunately, the
fallacy has some justification in the copyright statute because of the expansion of the
copyright monopoly from the single right to publish a book under prior copyright
statutes to the multiple rights to reproduce it in copies, to use it to prepare derivative
18 Pub.,L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (providing for a basic term of copyright
protection equal to seventy years following the author's death).
19 One of the interesting ironies the comparison reveals is that the landowner's title ceases
with his death to be assumed by grantees designated either by law or will; the "temporary" title to
copyright may continue for a humdred years or more without regard to heirs if the copyrighted work
is a work for hire.
20 An example is a book that one has purchased in order to learn.
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works, to distribute copies publicly, to perform it (by reading passages from it) and
to display it under the 1976 Act Even so, just because the owner ofreal and personal
property has plenary control to exclude is no reason to give the copyright holder
plenary control to exclude, as the 1976 Act does with minor exceptions, some of
which are down right trivial.21
The effect of giving the copyright holder multiple rights for all copyrighted works
is to enlarge the proprietary base of copyright. This is a critical change because the
scope of the proprietary base determines the power of the copyright holder to control
the conduct of others, both competitors and consumers, in the use of the copyrighted
work. The impact of this power becomes apparent when one considers that the
content of copyrighted works is information in various forms; that information is the
raw material of leaming; and that the right to learn is a natural law right protected by
both the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause (because free speech values are
components of the copyright policies mandated by the clause). And it seems obvious
that the larger the proprietary base of copyright the more copyright becomes a barrier
to bar the public from the learning fields except at the whim of the copyright holder,
who guards the gate. For with its increase in term, subject matter, and scope,
copyright ceases to be.merely a limited marketing monopoly and becomes a plenary
proprietary monopoly. This may not be the reason for, but it explains the wisdom of;
the traditional limitation on the copyright holder's proprietary interest to the market,
allowing the copyright holder to control the conduct of competitors, but not
consumers.
The 1976 Act building upon provisions in the 1909 Act, made other changes
that enhance the power of copyright entrepreneurs by increasing the height of the
copyright barrier. Two conditions of nineteenth-century copyright law were the
limitation of copyright to an author's own writings that were published, that is,
originality and publication. The first condition minimized free speech concerns
because generally one is not deemed to have a free speech right in another's speech
until the speech is made public, when the right of access comes into play;, and the
right of access to copyrighted works was guaranteed by publication as a condition for
copyright protection.22 By eliminating both conditions in the 1976 Act Congress
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (1994) (stating that "performance of a non-dramatic musical work
by... a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization, in the course of an annual agricultural
or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by such body of organization" is not an infringement
of copyright (but the performer may be liable)).
22 The publication of one's writings brings the right of access into play because the
publication affects ideas, opinions, and attitudes of the public. To say that one can publish his or
her writings and control access to them after theyhave left the stream of commerce-for whatever
reason, profit or politics-is to sanction private censorship. Consider, for example, the television
station that denies access to videotapes of its live newscasts. Since yesterday's newscasts have no
economic value as newscasts, we can assume that the control of access is to preclude use of the
tapes in order to preclude their use as evidence should the station be sued for defamation. See Pac.
& S. v. Duncan, 792 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1986) (prohibiting copying or selling ofbroadcast news
[Vol 62:703
PROPERTYRIGHTS & POLITICAL PJGHTS
provided a basis for creating a secondary market for the use of copyrighted works, a
significant development in view of the traditional limitation of copyright to the
primary market Copyright is no longer limited to an author's own writings by reason
of the work-for-hire doctrine (under which the corporate employer can be a surrogate
author) and the compilation copyright (since a compilation can contain public domain
material); protection begins as soon as the work is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, that is, created; and copyright holders have created a secondary market
by claiming the right to be paid when the purchaser of a copy of a copyrighted work
uses that copy.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, foreclosed the copyright holder's right to
control the secondary market for the sale of books in Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus,23 by
creating the first sale doctrine. Copyright holders thus had to create a secondary
market to have one to control, which they did by persuading Congress to divide the
right of publication into two separate rights: the right to reproduce copies and the right
to distribute the copies.24 The motive for the change, apparently ulterior at the time,
emerges when one realizes that the right to copy a work independently of distribution
provides a basis for claiming that anyone who copies the work without permission,
even for his or her own personal use, is infringing the copyright The change thus
provided for the basis for the pay-per-use paradigm, and as a bonus to the copyright
industry, it also provided the basis for an intellectual sabotage of the fair use doctrine.
Presumably the codification of fair use was intended to compensate for the
enhanced monopoly by giving consumers a fair use right. Since a defined right is a
limited right, it was a relatively simple task for copyright holders to limit fair use by
redefining the terms of the fair use statute, which they did in the Classroom
Guidelines.25 Thus, to state the amount that one may copy as a matter of fair use is
also to state what amount one may not copy without permission. If copying 1,000
words for the classroom is fair use, copying 1,050 words is infringement The result,
of course, is that fair use-touted a sacrifice by copyright holders to benefit the
public-became a means of enhancing the copyright monopoly by defining the
copyright barrier.
The subtlest aspect of what can be called the fair use scam, however, may be
found within the four factors used to determine when a use is a fair use. The fourth
factor relates to economic impact and effect on the market The subtle aspect of that
factor was to make the effect on the potential market a factor. This, of course, is a
logical thing to do if-and it is a big if-copyright is a proprietary monopoly intended
primarily to benefit the author. But the Supreme Court has time and again informed
programs). Arguably this is the type of private censorship that the free speech values of the
Copyright Clause are intended to prevent
23 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
24 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (1994).
25 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976).
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us that copyright is primarily to benefit the public interest, and that the author's
interest is secondary.26 There is a good argument then, that the potential market ploy,
because it enlarges the author's interest and diminishes the public interest, is
unconstitutional. It provides for a contingent copyright which arguably is inconsistent
with "the exclusive Right" that Congress can grant to authors for their writings.
The relevance of the enlarged proprietary base of copyright is that it gives
property rights precedence over political rights, which made it almost certain that the
latent conflict between copyright and free speech rights would come to fruition, as it
has in Chapter 12 of the Copyright Act. To provide copyright protection for
compilations of data, as well as, for example, a collection of short stories in digital
form is to subject information and learning to copyright control, despite the
limitations in the copyright statute,27 which copyright holders tend to ignore at their
convenience. Moreover, copyright that formerly protected this information against use
by competitors has come to protect it against use by consumers, a change accelerated
by the computer, which has the effect of giving the consumer some of the
characteristics of a competitor by enabling a person to use orto take material without
paying for the use. The word "take" is used advisedly, for consumers (as opposed to
competitors) have always been free to use copyrighted material without paying for it.
Consider the practice of borrowing books from free lending libraries. The self-interest
of copyright entrepreneurs, however, has motivated them to take the position that
copying a passage from the book is infringement a position that logically leads to the
conclusion that reading a book is a use of the copyright. But copyright was never
intended to preclude all uses by a consumer that might produce a profit for copyright
"protection has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible
uses of his work.' 28 A turnstile, for example, has not yet been placed at the library
door to require the payment of a fee for reading a book.
The danger, of course, is not only the creation of a licensing (that is, censorship)
paradigm for the use of copyrighted material, but that such an extension of copyright
will result in unconstitutional protection for public domain material and kill the first
sale doctrine. As the DMCA indicates, copyright follows the profit trail regardless of
constitutional limitations. The fact that the white pages of telephone directories were
copyright protected for some seventy years before the U.S. Supreme Court held in the
Feist case that such copyrights were unconstitutional for lack of originality
demonstrates the point.29 Presumably, one purpose of the DMCA is to override the
2 6 See e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ('The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors.'); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) ("[Ihe limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved.").
27 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
28 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 432.
29 Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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Feist ruling, the justification being the ease with which consumers, as well as
competitors, can enter an electronic database.
This purpose, however, is not apparent on its face. The only requirement for
copyright protection under the DMCA is that the material be in digital form, that is
in an electronic database, which effectively by-passes the condition that the material
be original. In theory, of course, the protected material must be a work of original
authorship under section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, but the statute does not define
the content of the database and the collection of material is made a creative act by
section 103. While in theory the database copyright will not protect the content,30 if
one is precluded by law from using technology to enter an electronic database of
undefined content, the copyright holder is free to determine that content and to dictate
the terms of entry, and no consumer has standing to complain even if the database
contains public domain material. The DMCA, in short, is a public law that relieves
copyright entrepreneurs of having to use private law of dubious efficacy to control
access to their databases, a matter of special concern if the database is the sole source
for the information it may contain.
]I.
Although the conflict between the DMCA and the First Amendment seems clear,
some people may not agree that it is consequential because they view copyright as
private property. For present purposes, however, the issue is why the conflict should
have become an issue. We start with a basic point At the most fundamental level, the
most important question in copyright theory is the nature and scope of its proprietary
base. The answer is determined by the condition for copyright, which in eighteenth-
century England was changed from the act of registration under the Licensing Act of
1662,31 to the acts of creation and publication under the Statute of Anne in 1710.32
In the U.S., copyright formalities-notice, registration, and deposit-became a part
of publication as a condition for copyright.
While creation as a condition for copyright in the form of originality was and is
part of American copyright law, the condition of publication (and copyright
formalities) was and now is not; and even originality has been fictionalized by
designating the act of compilation as an act of creation. Despite this cavalier
treatment, the issue of the proprietary base of copyright is critical in a free society
because as property, copyright is a justification for controlling the conduct of others
in the use of copyrighted material. As Holmes explained, copyright "is a prohibition
30 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). This is because the database will be a collective work If the
content is data, it will not be protected, if the database is a collective work containing copyrighted
works, the individual copyrights of the works provide the protection. The compilation copyright,
in short, protects the compilation as a whole, not the contents of the compilation.
3113 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (Eng.).
32 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
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of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the party having the right"33
Holmes's dictum, however, does not make clear whether the prohibition of conduct
of which he spoke relates to use of the copyright or the work. This oversight is not
surprising in view of the fact that the distinction is generally ignored, a failing that
explains much of the confusion in copyright law.34
The distinction between the work and the copyright is so important that I digress
here to discuss it briefly. The distinction may appear to be metaphysical, but it is
simply an example of an intangible right (copyright) tied to a physical object (a book)
that is subject to use. This is contrary to the manifestation of most intangible rights,
for example, stock ownership in the form of a stock certificate, the role of which is
to be evidence of the right The manifestation of copyright is in the form of an object
to be used. But "the character of the property [copyright] sought to be protected," as
the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "is not the physical thing created, but the right
of printing, publishing, copying, etc., which is within the statutory protection."35
What the Court determined to be true in 1908 continued to be true in 1985. 'Thus,
the property rights of a copyright holder have a character distinct from the possessory
interest of the owner of simple 'goods... ,' for the copyright holder's dominion is
subjected to precisely defined limits."'36
Apparently, however, the habit of reification causes most people to merge the
copyright and the work in their minds. This view is encouraged by copyright
entrepreneurs since the end result is to enhance the copyright monopoly, which may
explain why the codification ofthe distinction in section 202 ofthe 1976 Act has had
little impact Entitled, "Ownership of copyright as distinct from ownership of material
object," the section makes the difference between the copyright and work clear.37
The distinction has important consequences. To use the copyright is to exercise
a right of the copyright owner. For example, to publish a copyrighted book requires
permission from the owner of the copyright but one need not get permission to read
a copyrighted book or sing a copyrighted song in the shower. This distinction
between the use of the copyright and the use of the work assumes special importance
33 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring specially).
34 An example is the DMCA, which protects the work as well as the copyright since one is
forbidden from having access to the work without permission.
35 A. Tobacco Co. v. Werckrneister, 207 U.S. 284,298 (1907).
3 6 Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207,217 (1985).
37 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). While some might argue that to support my point and be
completely accurate, the section should be entitled, "Ownership of copyright as distinct from
ownership ofthe work contained in the material object," the argument proves too much. The work
itself is not subject to ownership other than by copyright which is merely a series of rights to
which the work is subject. The point is proved by the fact that at the end of a designated term, the
copyright ceases to exist while the work continues to become part of the public domain, which
makes apparent the distinction between the copyright and the work.
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as to books (or literary works) under the 1976 Act, which divided the right of
publication into two rights representing the two steps necessary to publish a work: the
right to reproduce the work in copies38 and the right to distribute the copies
publicly.39 The result here is to give the copyright holder the power to control the use
of the work as well as the copyright because it does not distinguish between copying
by a competitor and copying by a consumer. Eliminating this distinction was in fact
the purpose of the change, for it is the basis of the pay-per-use paradigm. Thus, under
this scheme, copyright claimants have taken the position that any copying without
permission is infringement, even copying a passage or article for one's research file,
for which the copier must pay. We can assume that prior to the 1976 Act-certainly
in the late nineteenth century-such copying was a use of the work, not the
copyright.4°
Arguably, to say that merely using a work is infringement is contrary to the
constitutional goal of copyright, the promotion of learning, for one cannot learn from
a work without using it. One use of a copyrighted book, for example, is to read it, a
use that copyright has never controlled. Yet, it is beyond question that the new control
of access-as the DMCA provides-controls the right to read. To put it bluntly, this
is a huge and unconstitutional intrusion by the exclusive rights of the copyright holder
that is occurring by a back-door mechanism. And it is no answer to say that the
copyright holder can always license access (for a fee), for the right to grant a license
is also the right to deny a license.
Returning to Holmes's dictum in White-Smith,41 whether he spoke of the use of
the copyright or the work is important because the answer determines the extent to
which copyright gives the right to control the conduct of others. If the prohibition
applies only to the copyright, the power is to be exercised only against competitors;
if it applies to the work, it can also be exercised against the consumer (as the DMCA
makes clear). Given the date and the holding of the case in which Holmes spoke, it
is almost certain that the dictum relates only to the copyright The date was 1908,
when the nineteenth-century view of copyright as a limited marketing monopoly
prevailed, as the holding demonstrates. The defendant's marketing of the plaintiff s
copyrighted musical composition in the form of a pianola role did not infringe the
copyright of the composition because the pianola role was not a copy. But arguably,
the explanation for the holding is that the plaintiff was not deemed to be harmed
because it marketed the composition only as sheet music. While the defendant used
the work, it did not use the copyright.
The holding is subject to criticism because the defendant made a profit using the
38 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
39 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
40 See, e.g., Stover v. Lathrop, 33 F. 348 (C.C. Colo. 1888).
41 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring specially).
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plaintiff's copyrighted work; but the case was made irrelevant by a provision in the
1909 Act that gave the copyright holder the right to make the first mechanical
recording of musical compositions and then the duty to allow others to record the
composition.42 This duty was implemented by a compulsory license, a device that
limited the copyright holder's right to control the conduct of competitors.43 The
compulsory license enables a competitor to use the copyright and is a concrete
manifestation of the importance of the distinction between the copyright and the
work. This importance is that the distinction is the basis for limiting the copyright
entrepreneur's control of others in the use of copyrighted material, and thus for
keeping the copyright monopoly within its constitutional boundaries. If, for example,
the publisher can prevent the teacher from copying an excerpt from a copyrighted
book for use in the classroom, arguably the copyright monopoly has been extended
beyond the scope of the grant that Congress is empowered to make. And, indeed,
there is a logically irrefutable argument that Congress recognized this point in the
1976 Act by designating multiple copies for classroom use as an exemplar of fair
use.44 Publishers, however, have managed to get judicial rulings to enable them to
circumvent this limitation in order to control the classroom conduct of both teachers
in teaching and students in learning. Two cases warrant mention, Basic Books, Inc.
v. Kinko Is Graphics Corp.,45 and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services.46 These cases held that commercial copy shops infringed when they made
copies at the request of professors for use in the classroom and were not entitled to the
fair use defense.47
Perhaps there is an argument that copy shops make use of the copyright in
reproducing the excerpts for profit, but this view requires a crabbed interpretation of
the language of section 107: "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work including such use
by reproduction in copies..., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
42 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1940)).
43 Despite the fact that Congress negated its holding, arguably White-Smith was rightly
decided for two reasons: one legal and one related to the claim of equity. The legal reason is the
distinction between the work and the copyright, which the Court consistently adhered to in the
nineteenth century, and which required the Court to hold as it did. The claim of equity, that the
holding was unfair to the author, ostensibly has less substance than it might have if it did not ignore
three facts: (1) the author always and inevitably makes use of public domain material in creating
his or her work; (2) the enlargement of the copyright monopoly is to the detriment of the public
interest; and (3) in the White-Smith case, the copyright holder was not the author as creator, but the
publisher as assignee. This last point is worth mentioning because historically, publishers have
used the protection of the author as ajustification for extending the copyright monopoly to their
own benefit as assignees of the author.
44 17 U.S.C § 107 (1994).
45 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
46 99 F. 3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
47 See Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 L. & CONrEMP. PROBs. 249 (1992); Patterson,
Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 1 INTELL. PROP. LAw 431 (1998).
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reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright." 48 The important point in interpreting
this language is that it refers to the conduct and not the actor; to the right of students
and professors, not the duty of copy shops. Apparently, the courts were influenced by
the idea that fair use is an excused infringement rather than a right If this is the nature
of fair use, it makes little difference whether the conduct is by the principal (the
teacher) or the agent (the copy shop). On the other hand, if fair use is a right, the agent
can exercise the right for the principal. The language of section 107--"the fair use of
a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement of copyright"-should mean that fair
use is a right Thus, Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., of the Eleventh Circuit made the point
in what bids fair to become a famous footnote.49
Despite this insight, the violation of statutory language obviously meant to
protect the teaching and learning process is not likely to concem many people because
the negative impact on students is seen as being minimal when compared to the
potential profit for publishers. Students are students for only a limited period of
time-and thus members of a constantly changing class-but publishers (or their
successors) can go on forever (and professors are subsidized in their scholarship and
research). This is what can be called the "localization of consequences" syndrome
(students are adversely affected only for a short period of time).
But there are several reasons that the consequences are not local. First, the result
of the rulings is that the courts sanction the pay-per-use practice, which enlarges the
copyright monopoly beyond its constitutional boundaries because it continues
copyright control of a book for use in the classroom after it has been purchased and
thus inhibits learning. Second, to give the copyright owners of leaning material a
veto power on the use of that material in the classroom is to give them the power to
affect the educational process upon which, in the long run, a free society depends if
it is to remain free. Third, the publishers' claim that they are entitled to be paid when
another person uses "their property" is based on a faulty premise. Their property is
not the work but the copyright, and making a copy of an excerpt for study by students
(a personal use) is not a use of the copyright and therefore not an infringement, at
least if section 107 is given a disinterested reading.
There may be an argument that the copyright holder is entitled to be paid
48 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
49 Judge Birch stated:
Although the traditional approach is to view 'fair use' as an affirmative defense, this writer,
speaking only for himself; is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the
Copyright Act of 1976. Originally, as ajudicial doctrine without any statutory basis, fair use was
an infringement that was excused-this is presumably why it was treated as a defense. As a
statutory doctrine, however, fair use is not an infringement. Thus, since the passage of the 1976
Act, fair use should no longer be considered an infingement to be excused; instead, it is logical to
view fair use as a right
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11 th Cir. 1996).
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whenever one uses a copy of his or her copyrighted book that has left the stream of
commerce and is on the library shelf. But proof that such an extension of copyright
power is constitutional is hard to find. There is a paucity of evidence that the framers
intended that copyright, which enables publishers to charge a sales tax, should also
empower them to charge a use tax. To paraphrase John Marshall's dictum that the
power to tax is the power to destroy,50 the power to tax the use of learning materials
is the power to control the learning process.
III.
It may be that the expansion of the proprietary base of copyright and the
concomitant enhancement of the copyright holder's power to control the conduct of
others in the use of copyrighted works is a good thing, even though it is a threat to
free speech rights. It is not, however, a good thing that lawmakers, both legislative
and judicial, have wrought the change under the influence of copyright entrepreneurs,
whose self-interest precludes a public interest perspective of the changes they
promote.51 It is not coincidental that most of the rules they promote are legal fictions
that provide additional protection for copyright entrepreneurs, for example, that the
employer of the author is the author.52 My purpose here is to provide an explanation
of why they have been so successful in overriding the public welfare and then to
suggest what needs to be done to correct the situation.
First, it will be useful to note the motivation for the change, a new source of
profit New communications technology has made pay-per-use feasible, for it enables
copyright entrepreneurs to market material directly to the consumer in piecemeal
fashion. This practice creates a marketing paradigm different from that originally
developed for copyright, which was to produce a physical object (a book) that was
sold to booksellers, who sold it to consumers, who were free to use it as they wished,
even to resell it.53 The reproduction of a book, of course, was beyond the capability
of the consumer, which made the risk of his or her invading the copyright domain
minimal. The only person against whom the copyright holder needed protection was
a competitor who had the capability of reprinting books as a literary pirate. Thus,
copyright did not protect against consumers because copyright was a marketing
50 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,431 (1819).
51 Professor Jessica Litman has shown the influence of the copyright industry on the
legislative process in two brilliant articles, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNaiLL. REV. 857 (1987); Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV.
275 (1989). These articles should be required reading for anyone interpreting the copyright statute,
especially judges.
52 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743-744 (1989); see also 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (deeming employer the "author" of work made for hire).
53 This right is protected bythe first-sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994), a codification of
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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monopoly and to protect the monopoly, it was necessary to protect copyright against
competitors but not consumers. Copyright entrepreneurs, however, have used the fact
that new technology enables the consumer to take material without paying for it as a
justification for increased protection to enhance their monopoly in the ever-present
interest of greater-and windfall--profits. Arguably, the limits on Congress's power
are intended to prevent the copyright monopoly from being used to gain windfall
profits, which, of course, usually come at the expense of the free speech right of
access.
The traditional marketing paradigm served Anglo-American copyright for some
four centuries, from the origin of copyright in the middle of the sixteenth century. 54
Arguably, the development that in the eyes of copyright entrepreneurs made the
paradigm inadequate was not the computer, but the high speed copying machine,
which presented a threat that publishers turned into an opportunity. If the consumer
could reproduce the copyrighted work with ease, the obvious solution was to require
the consumer to pay for the privilege, whether the work was copied in whole or in
part. This solution, however, was not necessarily compatible with the 1909 Copyright
Act, which gave the copyright holder the right to "print, reprint, publish, copy and
vend ' 55 the copyrighted work. The consumer who copied, but did not vend the work,
would not infringe the copyright because he or she did not sell the copy. There was,
of course, an argument that copying alone was infingement, but that interpretation
was contrary to legal culture, for the result would enable the copyright holder to
require the consumer to pay for using the work after having purchased it.
The most effective way to change legal culture is to change the law, and the
opportunity to change copyright law came with the proposal for updating the 1909
Copyright Act that resulted in the 1976 Act The process required some twenty years,
evidence that it would make a fundamental change in copyright law, providing time
enough to dull any concerns about adherence to the limitations the Copyright Clause
imposed on Congress's copyright power, for example, the limitation of copyright to
published works. The evidence that the framers understood copyright as applying
only to printed books is so overwhelming that it constitutes proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. But Congress ignored the proof and, in 1976, made changes that reshaped
copyright, presumably at the behest of the industry because the changes benefited
copyright entrepreneurs in preference to the author as well as the public. As a prelude
to dividing the right of publication into two separate rights, the right to reproduce the
work in copies and the right to distribute the copies publicly, it provided statutory
copyright for unpublished works.56
5 4 See generally LYMAN RAY PATIERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968)
(discussing the history of copyright).
5 5 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
56 The argument that the change was good because it eliminated dual copyright protection,
the common law copyright of the states, and the statutory copyright of the federal government was
based on a fallacy. The common law copyright was not a copyright; it was only the right of first
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The motivation for the change becomes clear in retrospect; it was to prepare the
way for the pay-per-use paradigm, which made no sense so long as the right was to
publish, that is to copy and sell the copies. This change is relevant to copyright in the
new millennium for this very reason, but also because it enlarged the proprietary base
of copyright, a change that has had more impact in its collateral than in its direct
consequences. The effect of broadening the proprietary base is to narrow the
distinction between the copyright and the work, a significant consequence in view of
the fact that the limitations the Copyright Clause imposes on Congress seem to
require that the distinction be maintained. The fact that copyright is to promote
learning, is to be limited in time, and requires an original work, suggests that
copyright is a limited right to which a given work is subject, the exclusive right to
publish. This is a narrow proprietary base, indeed, although today, the exclusive right
should be construed as the exclusive right to market a work because in 1787, the only
way for the author to market his or her writing was to publish it. The irony, of course,
is that by eliminating publication as a condition for copyright, Congress gave the
copyright holder the option of publishing or not publishing, while retaining all the
rights and privileges that copyright confers. Arguably, the option came at substantial
cost to the public interest because it eliminated the condition that copyright promote
learning by ensuring access.
IV.
The enlarged proprietary base of copyright was essential groundwork for the
DMCA because it added a new function of copyright-the protection of a service-
the same function that the DMCA would later serve. The result is a transmission
copyright in addition to the two traditional types of copyright, the publication
copyright and the performance copyright The transmission copyright is derived from
the common law performance copyright for dramas and musical compositions and
was created by the 1976 Act, which gave the performance right equal status with the
publication right, in part by downgrading the latter, which had always been a
condition for American copyright.57 The publication requirement, however, could be
an obstacle to the copyright protection for performance works, a point Congress
recognized in the 1909 Act by providing statutory copyright without publication for
works not reproduced in copies for sale, of which dramas and musical compositions
were two examples. 58 The 1976 Act removed the obstacle by providing that copyright
comes into existence as soon as a work of original authorship is fixed, that is, created.
This fundamental change in copyright law paved the way for the transmission
copyright because registering the transmission copyright before the transmission
publication.
57 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
58 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 11, 35 Stat. 1078 (repealed 1976).
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would result in copyright registration for a non-existent work.59 The most prominent
example of the transmission copyright is copyright for the electronic signals of live
television broadcasts. 60 The DMCA provides for ultimate control over such electronic
transmissions. While television gives the copyright holder control over the
transmission of the work only at the sending end, the DMCA gives the copyright
holder control at both the sending and receiving end, that is, it gives the copyright
holder complete control of access.
The transmission copyright thus protects a service in the guise of protecting
property and is the model that is likely to be widely used for the future. The question
is whether it creates a conflict between property rights and political rights that is too
great for it to survive in the American scheme of constitutional copyright a question
that has been confused by the importation of natural law into American copyright
jurisprudence. Because the natural law copyright provides a perspective that enables
judges to see copyright-which under the Constitution is to be a regulatory
monopoly-as an author's property right, they can almost always be persuaded that
the question relates to property rights, not free speech rights. As one court explained,
"[t]he First Amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in
intellectual property."6' The court did not, however, examine "the legally recognized
rights" 62 and as its smug assertion suggests, a major harm of copyright as a
proprietary monopoly is that it obscures the sacrifice of free speech rights on the
copyright altar.
We can eliminate the natural law confusion by looking to the beginning of the
statutory copyright in England, the Statute of Anne in 1710. For those not familiar
with copyright history, it is useful to point out that the relevance of an English statute
of almost three centuries ago is that its title was the source of the language of the
Copyright Clause.63 And because the English act was construed in two different cases
reaching opposite results within eighteen years of the Constitutional Convention in
1787, we can safely assume that both cases were familiar to the framers. If so, then
59 The copyright statute provides that the copyright of a television broadcast is to be
registered within three months aflter the broadcast. 17 U.S.C. § 41 l(bX2) (Supp. IV 1998).
60 The argument that the protection is for the "fixation" of the broadcast ignores two points.
The "fixation" requirement is a fiction to comply with the constitutional limitation of copyright to
an author's writings; and the idea that a videotape of a football game is a writing is a fiction. Thus,
we have a fiction on a fiction, which has expanded the copyright monopoly exponentially.
61 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1185 at
syllabus (5th Cir. 1979).
62 Id.
63 The title of the Statute of Anne read: "An act for the encouragement of leaming, by vesting
the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein
mentioned." 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). The Copyright Clause, omitting the patent clause, reads: "The
Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited
Times to Authors... the exclusive ight to their... Writings." U.S. r-, ST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the following two cases can be read as an annotation to the Copyright Clause:
(1) Millarv. Taylor,64 a King's Bench decision, telling us what it does not mean; and
(2) Donaldson v. Beckett 65 a House of Lords decision, telling us what it does mean.
Briefly, Millar was a case in which the London booksellers sought to overcome
the limitations that the Statute of Anne imposed on copyright by importing into
copyright jurisprudence the natural law in the form of the common law copyright
They succeeded in their goal, but their success was short lived. Five years after
Millar, the House of Lords overturned its ruling in Donaldson and limited the natural
law/common law copyright to the author's creations prior to publication. After
publication, the author's only protection was the statutory copyright.66
The Lords interpreted the Statute of Anne so as to protect the purpose of the
statute, but they rendered a compromise decision in doing so and created the common
law copyright as the author's property right before publication. The compromise may
have been necessary from a political standpoint, but it has proven to be unfortunate
from ajurisprudential standpoint because of the impact ofthe common law copyright
on the American statutory copyright. The natural law copyright came to the United
States as the common law copyright, which was deemed to be a plenary property right
of the author. As the Supreme Court explained in 1907, "the property of the author
or painter in his intellectual creation is absolute until he voluntarily parts with the
same,"67 that is, publishes it. Since there was no federal common law, the common
law copyright was a matter of state law, and it should not have tainted the statutory
copyright of federal law. But the idea that the common law copyright was the author's
absolute property combined with the author as the named beneficiary of the federal
copyright inevitably meant that the common law copyright would, by osmosis if
nothing else, shape ideas about the nature of the statutory copyright The culmination
of this influence was the elimination of publication as the dividing line between the
two copyrights. Removing publication as a condition for statutory copyright gave
credibility to the claim that the proprietary base of the statutory copyright should be
the same as that of the common law copyright.
64 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (KB. 1769).
65 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774); 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837
(H.L. 1774); 17 Cobbett's Pan. Hist. 953 (1813).
66 England thus rejected the natural law copyright in favor of the statutory grant copyright,
which the framers constitutionalized. The continental countries embraced the natural law copyright
and have, so to speak, constitutionalized it in the Berne Convention. Since the United States is now
a member of the Berne Convention, copyright holders have used the membership as ajustification
for incorporating natural law ideas into American law (i.e., the elimination of the formalities). This
raises an important issue. Is Congress, in enacting copyright legislation, to be governed by the
Copyright Clause or the Beme Convention? One point to remember is that in contrast to the
statutory grant copyright authorized by the Copyright Clause, the natural law copyright is primitive
in nature and contains no free speech values.
67 Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284,299 (1907).
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When we read the Statute of Anne, however, it is clear that it was primarily a
statute to regulate trade, not to benefit the author. While this view of the statute is
ostensibly contrary to the view that statutory copyright is an author's copyright in fact
it is not A word of explanation is in order. Prior to the Statute of Anne, copyright was
owned by publishers, and indeed, the early copyright-the stationers' copyright-was
not even available to authors because it was limited to members of the Stationers'
Company, a class that did not include authors. The copyright statute changed this
custom and for the first time vested ownership ofthe copyright in the author, which
supports the conclusion that statutory copyright is an author's right But given the
resentment against the booksellers' monopoly of the book trade, it is easy to see that
the vesting of copyright in the author was more to control the monopoly than it was
to benefit the author. The point is supported by the fact that copyright was available
only for printed books; if the intent had been to benefit the author, the statute surely
would not have ignored the author's right prior to publication and would have
recognized the author's right in unpublished works, as did the House of Lords in
Donaldson68 and Congress in the 1790 Act 69
The provisions of the statute itself-compared to the stationers' copyright that
was created by the registration of the title of a work and lasted in perpetuity-are
evidence that the Statute of Anne was essentially a trade regulation. The new statutory
copyright was for new works that were printed, and lasted for two terms of fourteen
years each, the renewal term to be available only to the author but only if the author
were living at the time of renewal. Otherwise, the work went into the public domain.
The most persuasive evidence of the statute's trade regulation function, perhaps, is
the fact that it contained extensive provisions for a remedy if the price of books was
too high and provided a qui tam action to enable private citizens to perform the role
of public prosecutor.70 Excessive price, the characteristic of a monopoly, was thus a
6 8 See supra note 65.
69 Section 6 provided:
And be it further enacted, That any person or persons who shall print or publish any
manuscript without the consent and approbation of the author or proprietor thereof, first had
and obtained as aforesaid, (if such author or proprietor be a citizen of or resident in these
United States) shall be liable to suffer and pay to the said author or proprietor all damages
occasioned by such injury....
1 Stat. 124; 1st Cong., 2d Sess., c. 15 (1790).
70 8 Ann., c. 19, § 4 (Eng.). The statute provided that "anyperson orpersons" could make a
complaint if they conceived the price of any book to be too high, and empowered the authorities
to make an inquiry, and upon a determination that the price was too high, to set an appropriate
price. If the settlement was violated,
in every such case such bookseller and booksellers, printer and printers, shall forfeit the sum of five
pounds for every such book... sold or exposed to sale, one moiety thereof to the Queen's most
excellent majesty, her heirs and successors, and the other moiety to any person or persons that shall
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trigger for direct, rather than indirect, regulation.
V.
The proposition that American copyright is a regulatory monopoly is the perfect
example of Justice Holmes' dictum that we need study of the obvious more than
investigation into the obscure.71 Because copyright is a monopoly, a statute that
provides limitations and exceptions to copyright to the extent the 1976 Act does
cannot be properly classed as anything other than a regulatory monopoly. Consider,
for example, the right of fair use (regulation in favor of the consumer); the
compulsory licenses (regulation in favor of competitors); the author's termination
right (regulation in favor of the author); and the limited copyright term (regulation in
favor of the public). The question, then, is not whether copyright is a regulatory
monopoly, but why this truism has been continually ignored. The answer, I think, is
copyright culture. A fact that we often overlook is the extent to which our thinking
is culture bound to the extent that it often resists reason and logic.72 If the culture is
that copyright is an author's property right, that culture is reason enough to reject
copyright as a regulatory monopoly.
My purpose at this point is to examine why copyright as a regulatory monopoly
is necessary to resolve the conflict between property rights and political rights for the
new millennium. There are three ideas to be developed: (1) the regulatory concept of
copyright has been undermined by the proprietary concept of copyright that has
resulted in a dual theoretical basis and a copyright law that contains irrational rules;
(2) copyright as trade regulation provides the basis for a body of coherent and rational
rules; and (3) the misappropriation rationale of unfair competition, i.e. trade
regulation, of International News Service v. Associated Press73 provides a better
model for copyright than the author's proprietary right model.
A. The Dual Theoretical Basis of Copyright
The constitutional concept of American copyright as a regulatory monopoly for
marketing works has been corrupted by the theory that copyright is a proprietary
monopoly of the author. The author's right theory of copyright based on natural law
is superficially appealing but fundamentally flawed because a natural law copyright
sue of the same, to be recovered, with costs of suit, in any of her Majesty's courts of record at
Wesininister.
The qui tam action indicates the extent to which the statute was regulatory in nature.
71 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurring
specially).
72 What other explanation is there for racial, religious, and ethnic prejudice?
73 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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is a primitive copyright that benefits only the author and the author's publisher as
assignee. Since it is different from the statutory grant copyright permitted by the
Copyright Clause, it creates a dual theoretical base for copyright that is a significant
impediment to rational copyright jurisprudence. Ambiguous copyright theory is, of
course, fertile ground for legal fictions that benefit the publisher to the detriment of
the author because the author is the designated beneficiary of copyright and it is
therefore not necessary to engage in legal fictions to benefit the author. Legal fictions,
in turn, produce irrational rules as measured by the public interest In a constitutional
scheme of copyright, reason cannot explain the following: (1) how an author's
statutory monopoly that comes into existence as soon as a work is created, serves the
public interest; (2) why the act of selecting, arranging, or coordinating public domain
works is an act of creation that merits a three or four generation monopoly, (3) why
an employer of an author, including corporations, should be designated as an author,
(4) how the electronic signals for television broadcasts are a writing; or (5) how it is
that a computer program is not a process or procedure that the statute says copyright
does not protect.
The DMCA demonstrates the relevance of these fictions to copyright for the new
millennium, which is their utility in circumventing the limitations on Congress's
copyright and free speech powers, the former being calibrated, the latter being
absolute. An electronic database, for example, may be a compilation created as a
work-for-hire (which makes the employer the author) that may consist of public
domain facts (which are not copyrightable), access to which may be permitted only
on a pay-per-use basis (which is inconsistent with the promotion of learning). The
DMCA, in short, treats copyright as a proprietary monopoly that gives the holder
complete control of access to information and learning, as if copyright were the fee
simple title to real property rather than a limited statutory grant We should not forget
that proprietary rights in information and learning can reduce free speech rights to the
status of an empty slogan.
There are, of course, explanations for the logical solecisms in the form of legal
fictions, and to point out their infirm intellectual foundation is not to say that they are
all without merit, even if they do fulfill the self-serving goals of copyright
entrepreneurs. The measure of the constitutionality of the rules, however, is not how
they serve copyright holders, but whether they also serve the public interest. While
the latter term is notoriously subjective, the Copyright Clause provides its measure
with the policies it mandates: the promotion of learning, the protection of the public
domain, and public access. The writing of a book, of course, is an insufficient
condition for learning, for it is the distribution of the book that promotes learning. The
requirement of an original work protects the public domain--protection that is
weakened when the public domain is invaded for the compilation copyright And to
grant copyright without publication defeats the policy of public access. We can
assume that it is not coincidental that the effect of the legal fictions is to provide
additional copyright protection more for the benefit of the manufacturer of books than
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for the creators of manuscripts.
The important point, however, is the reason used to justify the irrational rules,
which is that copyright is a proprietary monopoly of the author as a matter of natural
law. This means that the rules do not distinguish between the copyright and the work;
for under natural law, the absolute property of the author, acknowledged by the U.S.
Supreme Court in American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,74 could only mean that
the author owned both. Thus, one effect of legal fictions is to encourage courts to treat
the copyright and the work as one property so that ownership of the copyright entails
ownership of the work, a treatment that finds support in the five (now six) rights in
section 106 of the 1976 Act.75 There is nothing for a copyright holder to do with a
book other than to reproduce it in copies, to use it to prepare derivative works, to
distribute copies to the public, to perform, or to display it publicly.
Thus, the extensive grant of rights effectively obscures the distinction between
the copyright and the work. And as the DMCA proves, the major effect is to
empower copyright entrepreneurs to negate the three policies of the Copyright Clause:
the promotion of learning, the protection of the public domain, and public access.76
Therefore, the ownership of the work would allow the copyright owner to preclude
its use for learning, to deplete the public domain, and to make public access a matter
of the copyright holder's discretion. Further, to use statutory copyright to vest
ownership of the work in the author is to make the author, not the public, the primary
beneficiary of copyright, which does not make sense from a policy standpoint. Why
should the framers draft a provision of the Constitution to give a small class of
citizens-however worthy-a special benefit in the form of an absolute monopoly
over learning? And if the author is the primar beneficiary, why should the reward
be conditioned (on publication), limited (to the exclusive right to publish for a limited
time), and predicated on a benefit to the public (by promoting learning)?
Even as a matter of history--much less logic-the author as the primary
beneficiary of copyright implied by natural law does not make sense. The copyright
that originated in England as a proprietary monopoly of publishers was objectionable
because it gave them a monopoly of learning. The Statute of Anne designed copyright
to be a regulatory monopoly in order to destroy-and prevent the recurrence of-the
proprietary monopoly. A major part of the statutory scheme was to make the author
the initial owner of copyright. This was significant because prior to the statute the
only copyright holder was the publisher, who could obtain a copyright merely by
registering the title of a work in the appropriate register book of the Stationers'
Company. The drafter of the Statute of Anne (reputed to be Jonathan Swift) needed
a justification for granting the copyright monopoly, other than registration of the title.
74 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
75 See id. at 299. Section 106 of the 1976 Act is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp.
1998).
76 See supra note 11 (quoting the Copyright Clause).
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The solution was to require the creation of a new work, and because authors create
works, they became the named beneficiary. But the motive for naming authors the
beneficiary means that they were only incidental beneficiaries. And it is time to
recognize that while the publisher's copyright was designed as a proprietary
monopoly, the author's copyright was designed as a regulatory monopoly.
B. The Regulatory Monopoly and Rational Copyright Rules
My argument is twofold: that rational copyright rules are essential for protecting
and preserving the copyright policies in the Copyright Clause; and the key to rational
copyright rules is copyright as a regulatory monopoly. If we assume that integrity is
important in applying the law, the first point can be taken as a given. This is because
integrity requires that the rules be properly related to each other and to the whole, a
process for which rational rules are necessary. The second point follows from the fact
that copyright as a proprietary monopoly results in irrational rules. This is inevitable
because the subject of copyright-information and learning-means that copyright
should accommodate-and thus allocate rights among-three classes of persons:
authors, entrepreneurs, and consumers. But property is a bilateral concept concerning
the property owner and everyone else, the purpose of which is to protect the property
owner. Copyright as the proprietary monopoly of copyright owners is an
unsatisfactory basis for allocating the rights in relation to learning materials. From this
perspective, it becomes apparent that rules of ownership are not designed, and cannot
provide a reasonable basis for resolving the conflicts that inevitably arise in the
domain of copyright law, unless the decision is always to be in favor ofthe copyright
holder. The basis for the decision should not be rules of ownership, but the conduct
of the parties in relation to each other, whether the parties are authors, entrepreneurs,
or consumers. This is the trade regulation approach.
Once we accept the idea that copyright is an author's right in name only, we can
recognize that the Statute of Anne made copyright a regulatory monopoly to promote
learning and to limit the utility of copyright as a device of monopoly and censorship.
The statutory copyright was a means of regulating trade in much the same way its
predecessor (the stationers' copyright) was a means of monopolizing trade. The
conclusion that the statutory copyright was designed to regulate the book trade is so
obviously true that we do not have to resort to history to support this conclusion. The
language of the Copyright Clause itself tells ug that copyright can be only a
regulatory, not a proprietary, monopoly. It could not be otherwise if copyright is to
promote learning, to protect the public domain, and to provide public access. There
are, however, two questions to be answered. Since copyright even as a regulatory
monopoly is property, what kind of property is it? And if it is so clear that statutory
copyright began as a regulatory monopoly, why was this understanding lost?
Of the various property concepts, ranging from fee simple title to estates of
various kinds to easements, the easement is the most likely candidate for defining the
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property of copyright. One of the disadvantages of most property law is that it tends
to be rule-bound in the interest of certainty, at least when the issue is a controversy
between two property claimants. Once a property rule is established, it is difficult to
use reason alone to uproot it, as the rule against perpetuities demonstrates. The
easement, however, is an exception to the rigidity of property rules generally in that
it is flexible, presumably because it is a limited property right. Thus an easement can
be defined as a right to use property that one does not own, and can be used to
allocate use of the same property among different persons or classes of persons. An
easement, in short, is a limited right to which property owned by another is subject
(for example, an easement for power lines), a definition that describes copyright,
which is a series of rights to which a given work is subject (for example, to reproduce
the work in copies or to perform the work publicly). Parenthetically, one of the
characteristics of an easement is that the use does not result in a destruction of the
property used, and, of course, copyrighted works can be used without being
consumed. The loss of copyright, for example, does not mean the loss of the right to
publish the work, only the loss of the exclusive right to publish it.
Therefore, as a matter of public policy, copyright must accommodate three
classes of persons-authors, entrepreneurs, and consumers---each of which has an
easement either by conduct, contract, or law. The author has an easement to use
public domain material in creating a work (by conduct); the entrepreneur has an
easement to market the works (by contract with the author); and the consumer has an
easement to use the works for learning and entertainment (by law). The unique aspect
of copyright is that the subject of the easements, the work, is not capable of ownership
otherwise. This is because the essence of all copyrighted works is ideas, and it is basic
law that copyright does not protect ideas, only their expression, a rule that is necessary
to protect the distinction between the copyright and the work and to prevent copyright
from invading the free speech domain. The expression represents the easement of the
author;, the distribution of the expression represents the easement of the entrepreneur;,
the right of personal use represents the easement of the consumer.
This analysis suggests the answer to the second question: why was the idea of
copyright as an easement lost? An easement presupposes property owned by someone
other than the person holding the easement. In the beginning of statutory copyright,
it was understood that there was a distinction between the copyright and the work.
The property owned was the copyright, not the work. As provisions of the Statute of
Anne and the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution make clear-and as
confirmed by rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court-copyright was essentially the right
to reproduce a work in copies.77 The distinction was lost primarily because of the
common law copyright and the fiction that statutory copyright is an author's right If
77 See, ag., Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182,188 (1909) (holding that the
copyright statute gives author "the exclusive right to multiply copies for a limited period"); Bong
v. Alfred S. Campbell Art Co., 214 U.S. 236, 245 (1909) (stating that the "purpose of copyright
law is ... to secure a monopoly, having a limited time, of the right to publish the production").
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the author owned the copyright of the work he or she created, surely the author owned
the work. The fiction, however, ignores the fact that the copyright and the work are
two different things, and the ownership of one did not imply ownership of the other.78
Thus after the copyright term expires, the work continues in the public domain. Even
so, the copyright and the work merged in the minds of copyright holders who came
to think of the two as one property, which, of course, enhanced their control of the
work.
The most dramatic example of the merger of copyright and work is the fair use
doctrine. As created inFolsom v. Marsh,79 the fair use doctrine involved only the use
of the copyright because it was the right of one author to make fair use of another
author's work in creating a new work. That doctrine, however, may represent one of
the greatest intellectual shell games in all of jurisprudence because it is a concept
treated as if it involves the taking of an author's property that diminishes the copyright
monopoly when in fact it has been continually used to increase that monopoly.80 The
missing element that would make the fallacy of the "fair-use-is-a-sacrifice-of-the-
author" apparent is a knowledge of the limited nature of copyright in the nineteenth
century when Joseph Story created the fair use doctrine to enlarge the author's rights.
Prior to Folsom, it was fundamental copyright law that another author could abridge,
translate, or dramatize another's copyrighted work to create another work without
infringing the copyright.8 ' This meant that prior to fair use, one could use the entire
work to create another work; after fair use, one could use only a portion of a work to
create another work. When properly understood, then, the fair use doctrine played a
major role in the expansion of the proprietary base of copyright that obscured
copyright's nature as a trade regulation concept.
The harm was more serious than has been recognized, for copyright as a trade
78 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207,217 (1985) ("[Tjhepropertyrights of a copyright
holder have a character distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of simple 'goods, wares,
[or] merchandise,' for the copyright holder's dominion is subjected to precisely defined limits.").
79 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
80 An obvious example is the Classroom Guidelines. A subtle example is the contingent
copyright protection in factor four of section 107 of the 1976 Act. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). See
generally L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. IML PROP. LAw 431 (1998)
(providing a critical analysis of the origin of the fair use doctrine).
81 The author's
exclusive property in the creation of his mind, cannot be vested in the author as abstractions, but
only in the concrete form which he has given them, and the language in which he has clothed them
When he has sold his book the only property which he reserves to himself, or which the law gives
to him, is the exclusive right to multiply the copies of that particular combination of characters
which exhibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed. This is what the law terms
copy, or copyright.
Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514), in C. 0. Bull. 15 at 2484
(holding that the German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin is not an infringement of copyright).
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regulation has a more subtle, and perhaps more important, role in the administration
of copyright law than allocating rights. Because one of the purposes of trade
regulation is to provide a remedy for a competitor's unfair conduct in trade, ifwe treat
copyright as trade regulation rather than property, we will be able to focus on rules
of conduct rather than rules of property to determine the propriety of the parties'
actions. The value of this approach is that it avoids the rule-bound approach of
property and makes the conduct of the copyright owner as well as the alleged
infringer a part of the infringement equation. If, for example, the copyright holder
ceases to publish a work, the right of fair use should be expanded; and an alleged
infinger who steals the manuscript of a book to copy a portion for a news article
should be denied the defense of fair use. The point is that copyright holders have
duties as well as rights, as the concept of copyright misuse implies. The development
of this doctrine, however, is hindered by copyright as a proprietary monopoly because
one of the rights of property, the right of use, implies the right of misuse. So long as
the public is not endangered, misuse is a minor anomaly that may be condemned but
seldom remedied. One can tear down one's house, but one is not free to bum it and
place neighboring houses at risk.
The easement theory is a sound basis for resolving the copyright conflict between
property rights and political rights for new communications technology in the new
millennium for a very simple reason. The source of the conflict is the designation of
copyright as a proprietary monopoly. The easement theory returns copyright to its
historical base as a regulatory monopoly to serve the public interest. But there is still
another question to be answered. Why should we return to copyright as it was when
moveable type was the computer of the day? After all, new problems require new
solutions. The best answer to the question, perhaps, is that the fundamentals of
copyright law do not change with communications technology. Regardless of the
form the communication takes-printing press, television, or computer-it is
important that copyright promote learning, that the public domain be protected, and
that the right of access to learning material be preserved. This is another way of
saying that integrity is important in the administration of copyright law, and this
integrity is dependent in large measure on a body of logical and coherent rules.
C. The Relevance ofInternational News Service v. The Associated Press to
Copyright for the New Millennium
The paradigmatic copyright for the new millennium will be the transmission
copyright, of which the DMCA is merely an early example. While there is serious
question as to whether it will pass constitutional muster, that statute can serve as the
exemplar of copyright legislation for protecting a service. This is contrary to the
traditional copyright, a monopoly that protects the material (a book) that is the subject
of the service (distribution by publication). The monopoly of the material provides a
monopoly for the service, but when the subject of the monopoly is the material, it is
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a relatively simple task to limit the scope of the monopoly of both the material and the
service. It is necessary only to terminate the monopoly of the material. To provide a
monopoly for the service, however, is to forfeit the traditional protection limiting the
copyright monopoly.
This is not readily apparent for two reasons. First is the use of fictions. The
condition for the copyrighted material and the copyrighted service is ostensibly the
same-the creation of an original work by an author. But the condition of a creation
by an author is reduced to a fiction. Who, for example, is the author of a televised
NFL football game? And is it really true that the compiler of judicial cases for an
electronic database is actually an author? Second, the copyright protection for both
the material and the service enable the copyright holder to control the conduct of the
consumer in relation to the material. But the control of the consumer's conduct ends
when the consumer purchases the copyright of the material. The control of the
conduct of the consumer when the service is protected continues and the consumer
must satisfy the condition of the copyright holder, which almost inevitably will be a
license for a fee.
My point is that when the rules of copyright for material are applied to copyright
for a service, the result is protection beyond the limits of the Copyright Clause. This
may be desirable, but it is not so desirable that we should continually use legal fictions
to denigrate and defeat the policies of the Copyright Clause. But, as in many
instances, the solution to new problems is suggested by the solution to a problem
seemingly far removed from the present In this instance, the solution is suggested by
an old case decided in 1918, International News Service v. Associated Press (INS v.
AP)S2
INS v. AP was a copyright case without the copyright. The litigants were
competitors in the business of providing news dispatches to newspapers for profit.
The time was World War I, and the controversy was precipitated by the fact that INS
correspondents were excluded from the European theater of war for censorship
violations, which led INS to use various schemes to obtain AP news dispatches to
transmit to its subscribers. Such schemes included the bribery of AP employees and
the taking of reports from published newspapers on the east coast to send to
subscribers on the west coast. AP's news dispatches were copyrightable, but the
provisions of the 1909 Act made it impractical to copyright them. Publication with
notice, registration, and deposit would have been a logistical nightmare for a news
organization that, we can assume, sent hundreds of unpublished news reports to
hundreds of subscribing newspapers daily.
AP sued INS on the theory of unfair competition, but the Court ruled that the
traditional basis of unfair competition-passing off-was inapplicable because the
source of the news reports was irrelevant to the consumer. Even so, the Court was not
willing to approve the conduct of INS and created the misappropriation branch of
82 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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unfair competition because defendant was reaping where it had not sown. While
recognizing that there was no property right in hews as to the public, the Court held
that there was a quasi-property right as between competitors, who were providing
news reports as a commercial service, and granted relief only until the value of the
reports as news had passed. The Court did not decide the case as a copyright case
because there was no copyright Therefore, the Court could not proceed on the basis
that the material (the news dispatches) was protected property. Instead, the Court
proceeded on the ground that the issue involved was not protection for the material,
but protection for the service oftransmitting the material to clients. The transmission,
however, did not give the transmitter rights in the dispatches as against the public.
The Court, in effect, limited the property right in news to that of a temporary
easement And it did so by treating the case as a tort, not a property, case, thereby
avoiding the rule-bound decision that property cases demand. Since the only
difference the presence of copyright would have made would have been in the relief
granted-presumably, the injunction would have been absolute and statutory
damages would have been awarded-4he case suggests that copyright law is statutory
unfair competition based on the misappropriation, that is, copying, rationale.
The difference between INS v. AP and the DMCA protection of databases is that
the DMCA provides protection for the content in order to provide protection against
the ultimate consumer as well as the competitor. The question for those who claim the
DMCA is constitutional is this: may Congress grant a business the power to deny a
consumer the right of access to information in order to protect the business against
competitors, a process normally left to market forces? Consider the fact that television
developed and prospered for some thirty years in this country without copyright
protection for live television broadcasts. If television station A pirated station B's
programs, station B could pirate station A's programs. But this, of course, does not
protect the station against the consumer, which apparently is the goal, according to
the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of-America v. Universal City Studios.83 The
irony is that statutory copyright, created to protect the public by regulating the
copyright monopoly, has been transformed into a property right to extend and protect
the monopolists against the public.
We should not, however, overlook the unique nature of copyright as property the
grant that creates the property also limits the property. This fact makes it not only
appropriate, but desirable, that copyright holders who seek to control the conduct of
others in the use of copyrighted material should have their own conduct evaluated
when they seek to hold others accountable. We need, then, to view copyright law as
trade regulation, not property.
It is important, however, to understand two things. First, copyright as trade
regulation will not serve to defeat the interests of copyright owners except to the
83 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that an individual's copying of motion pictures constituted
a "fair use").
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extent that the owners attempt to expand that interest beyond the boundaries of the
Copyright Clause. Second, copyright as trade regulation is the key to integrity in the
administration of the copyright law because it will enable courts to render decisions
in light of the facts as well as the law. When copyright is treated as trade regulation,
duties of the copyright holder and rights of the consumer become a part of the
copyright equation. Common sense tells us that fair use is a right, not merely a
defense, and once we accept this point, the copyright holder has a duty to respect the
consumer's right of use. This is true whether the copyright is a publication copyright,
a performance copyright, or a transmission copyright And arguably, the transmission
copyright has provided a commendable service, for it makes clear how the proprietary
copyright to protect the publication and performance of works harms the public
interest.
Thus, both consumers and courts are disadvantaged by copyright as a proprietary
monopoly. If, for example, copyright holders use an overly broad and illegal
copyright notice, the consumer has no standing to complain. Where this issues arises,
courts face the idea that the work is the property of the copyright holder and have a
difficult time concluding that one cannot do this with his or her property. These
inhibitions are removed if courts recognize copyright as a constitutionally authorized
regulatory monopoly, for they are then required to consult the Copyright Clause, the
copyright statute, and judicial precedent to measure the propriety of the private law
that copyright holders use, often promiscuously. And it is appropriate to take special
note of an important fact-courts interpreting the copyright statute are bound by the
Copyright Clause no less than Congress is bound in enacting such statutes.
It is not possible in a short paper to lay out the scheme of copyright as trade
regulation in full, but there are several points to be made. Copyright law consists of
constitutional law, statutory law, judicial law, and private law; copyright holders seem
to be wholly unaware of the first, to ignore the second and third when those laws do
not suit their purpose, and to use the fourth to override those legal rules of which they
disapprove. They are able to do so because they rely on rules out of context, and
courts often are not aware of the context, which makes my point So complex a body
of jurisprudence as copyright law cannot be administered in terms of rules alone, for
law consists also of principles and policies. And for copyright, the policies and
principles may be more important than the rules. To make the protection of copyright
a matter of conduct rather than property rights is to bring the policies and principles
into consideration and recognize that copyright holders have duties as well as rights.
Copyright is essentially the law of communication and communication is the life
blood of a free society. And as the means of communication change, it is inevitable
that copyright law will change. That change will take one of two routes: (1) the
enlargement and enhancement of the copyright monopoly in order to accommodate
copyright to the changes; or (2) a reevaluation of copyright to determine the
appropriate accommodation to make. The first route is the one that has been taken so
far, as the DMCA indicates. But the DMCA also proves the need for the second route
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because that statute disregards the policies the Copyright Clause mandates, and the
reason for the reevaluation of copyright is to protect those policies. As communication
becomes more complex, copyright as a proprietary monopoly increasingly endangers
those policies. That is the reason for understanding that copyright is a regulatory
monopoly, to enable courts, unhindered by the rule-bound property law, to protect
those policies. The suggestion is not radical because this approach will return
statutory copyright to its origins, when it was de facto protection for free speech and
a free press. The cost of disregarding the past will be the diminution of the right upon
which a free society depends, the freedom to learn, a right guaranteed by the First
Amendment and promoted by the Copyright Clause. Proprietary rights in information
and learning not only reduce free speech rights to the status of an empty slogan, they
also make a mockery of the limited copyright monopoly that the framers empowered
Congress to grant.
